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11.Introduction
  Because of the rapid aging societies such as Japan, the control of medical
expenditure has been among the most prominent issues in the policy debate. In
discussing medical cost-control policy, information about the price elasticity of
demand for medical services is of paramount importance.  Unfortunately, very
few research has been undertaken on this topics in Japan
(Ogura(1990),Nishimura(1987)).  Because of the difficulty in accessing data at
the hospital or household level in Japan, these researches consist of estimates
derived from cross-sectional data aggregated in the prefecture level, or time
series data aggregated at the national level. These researches have, therefore,
suffered from various statistical problems associated with aggregate data, such
as cross-section bias and spurious regression.  Moreover, the data on health
care expenditure comprises expenditure related to both minor and serious
illnesses.  Minor illnesses are defined as illness such as common cold and
diarrhea, which are curable by standard treatment at reasonable cost, and by
alternative treatment such as OTC medicine, natural recovery, and remedies
based on folklore.  Research using aggregate measures of health care
expenditure cannot really contribute to policy formation, because the luck of
substitution for non-minor illnesses such as cancer or heart attacks makes it
impossible to determine price elasticity.
  In the United States, despite extensive research in health economics, only a
few studies focus on demand for medical care for minor illnesses or the
substitution between prescribed and OTC medicine(Stuart and James, 1995;
Fillenbaum et al.,1995).  The significant exception to this is Newhouse(1993),
who uses data from RAND Health Insurance Experiment.  This data set avoids
the various problems associated with aggregate data.  Moreover, as it consists
of household rather than hospital data, it may clarify the decisions that patients
make before visiting a doctor.  Leibowits(1989) undertakes important research
that focuses on minor illnesses and studies the substitution between prescribed
and OTC medicine.
  Ii and Ohkusa(1999a) and Ii and Ohkusa(1999b) are the first attempts to
estimate the price elasticity of the demand for health care for minor illnesses in
2Japan.  Their analyses explicitly take into account the substitution between
formal medicine and OTC or natural recovery.  Using micro data from the
Living Standard Survey in Japan, Ii and Ohkusa (1999a) find that elasticity is
distributed in the range 0.0123 - 0.149.  On the other hand, Ii and Ohkusa
(1999b) use original data when specializing in the common cold.  This research
reveals price elasticity in the range 0.23 - 0.36.  However, these studies, which
control as much as possible for individual properties, may not be immune from
the contamination of cross-sectional bias because, unless panel data is used,
they cannot completely eliminate the individual effect.  If the questionnaire
asks the patient’s choice under several hypothetical situations over cross-
sectional data collection, it can be regarded as a kind of panel data.  In this
sense, the research would supplement that which uses micro data, as do Ii and
Ohkusa(1999b).
  In this research, Conjoint Analysis(CA) is one of the most reliable techniques
for dealing with the individual effect by using a questionnaire survey.  The CA
questionnaire services hypothetical choice.  Thus, the researchers can analyse
choice by reference to the scenarios, and individual properties in statistical
models fully control out the individual effect.
  To evaluate the benefit of a new medicine or a new technology in the field of
health economics, researchers have conventionally employed the Willingness to
Pay (Tolley et al (1994)) or Standard gamble, Time trade-off and Rating Scale
methods.  However, these methods suffer from various theoretical problems.
For instance, the price obtained by Willingness to Pay obviously differs from
utility.  The other three methods also display this shortcoming, which is not
utility.  Under the theoretical concept of ordinal utility, utility cannot be
compared or aggregated among individuals.  Compared with Willingness to
Pay, CA has the advantage that respondents react as the price is given and make
no prior assumptions about their choices.  Furthermore, the statistical model
using CA can experiment with policy simulations by changing the explanatory
variables.
  First, CA has conventionally been widely used in the field of environment economics and
traffic economics.  In health economics, CA has recently been frequently applied
3to the evaluation of new medical treatment technology(Ryan, 1999a;?Ryan, 1999b;
Bryan, 1999;?Telser and Zweifel, 1999;?Ratcliffe, 1999;?San Miguel and Ryan, 1999;
Johnson et al, 1999;?Ryan and Farrar; 1994;?Ryan and Hughes, 1997;,?Van der Pol and
Cairns, 1997;?Van der Pol and Cairns, 1999;?Bryan et al., 1998).  For example, it has
been applied to examinant fertilization(Ryan , 1999a), dentistry correction
technology(Ryan and Farrar, 1994), suspension technology(Ryan and Hughes,
1997), blood transfusion technology(Van der Pol and Cairns, 1997) and the
application of magnetic resonance imaging(MRI) to  damage caused by knee
injuries(Bryan et al., 1998).
  Although CA may be more excellent method than conventional ones, it
potentially suffers from bias arising from two sources: hypothetical choice and
hypothetical scenarios.  The purpose of this research is to distinguish and
evaluate each kind of bias.  If CA is applied more frequently to other fields, the
magnitude of bias should be evaluated 1).  Especially with regard to the latter,
we estimate the impact of bias by using the information about people who have
no health insurance.
  This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data obtained
from an original survey.  Section 3 presents demand for health care using CA.
The biases arising from hypothetical choice and scenario are evaluated in
section 4 and 5, respectively.  Section 6 summarizes the result and discusses
further research.
2.Data
  The data used here were obtained from research conducted by the authors.
The respondents were 20-60 years who live in western Japan.  The sample was
chosen randomly from a telephone book.  The survey was conducted in January
and February 1998.  We sent the questionnaire to respondents after they had
confirmed by telephone that they would cooperate.  Some 544 respondents
replied to the questionnaire.
  The question mainly used in this research is: “When you have the symptom of
a cold, such as a temperature of 38 degrees, mucus, and a sore throat, and you
think that you have caught a cold, what action do you decide to take? ”.  The
4respondents have three choices: “visit to a doctor right away”, “take OTC
medicine”, and “do nothing”.  They make this hypothetical choice under the
hypothetical scenario of coinsurance rate such as 30%, 40%, 50%, 70%, 100%
and under that of actual rate 2).
  While conventional researches (Ii and Ohkusa, 1999b) analyses the demand
for medical services under the actual coinsurance rate alone, by using CA, we
analyse the demand under hypothetical coinsurance rates as well as the actual
one.
  Since the Japanese public health insurance system is compulsory, it is illegal
in Japan to be uninsured.  However, some people do not change their insurance
when they move from employed-based insurance scheme to a regional one.
Moreover, people who fail to pay the insurance premium is suspended their
insurance or utilize it only by visiting the regional insurance office and paying
the amount in arrears.  We refer to such people as the ‘actually uninsured’,
since they act as if they are not covered by health insurance.  The actually
uninsured consists of people who are without health insurance at present and
those who were without it in the past.  A sample number of 19 people belonged
to at least one category.
  The questionnaire includes additional questions, relating to dependents,
household income, household assets, household debt, labor income in the last
year, age, gender, education level, working status and so on.  Summary
statistics of these data are shown in Table1.
3.Estimates of the Demand for Health Care using Conjoint
Analysis
  In this section, the demand by people with the common cold for medical
services and that for OTC medicine are estimated under several hypothetical
coinsurance rates using CA.    
  Table2 indicate a sample distribution around the actual coinsurance rate.  In
this paper, the term “actual” means “not hypothetical”.
  While the actual coinsurance rates for most persons are 20% and 30%, as
legally required, between 1% and 2% of the population have an actual
5coinsurance rate of 0%, 10%, 15% and 100%.  Of these rates, the first three
imply insurer subsidies above the legal level, while the 100% rate implies the
absence of insurance.
  First of all in this section, the methodology of estimation is described and the
estimated results given of the demand for medical services of people with the
common cold.  Second, the bias arising from hypothetical choice is discussed
by the way of comparison with the estimates of Ii and Ohkusa(1999b).  Third,
the bias arising from hypothetical scenario is evaluated by comparison with the
actually uninsured and the hypothetical scenario of the uninsured.
  The dependent variables are trinominal: Ti,k =1 if a patients go to visit a
doctor, Ti,k =2 if a patient takes OTC medicine, and Ti,k =0 in other cases.  The
explanatory variables are age Ai, gender (Gi =1 if female, Gi =0 if male),
education Ei (Ei =1 if graduated from a university or college, Fi =0 if not),
working status in the last year (Wi =1 if working, Wi =0 if not), labor income in
the last year Li, household income in the last year other than own labor income
Ii , household assets Si and real coinsurance rate Ri,k.  A subscript k in Ti,k and
Ri,k corresponds to the real coinsurance rate that consists of actual coinsurance
rate and hypothetical coinsurance rate(30%, 40%, 50%, 70% and 100%).
Needless to say, where the actual rate is 30%, the 30% hypothetical scenario is
omitted.
?Following Ii and Ohkusa(1999b), the estimation equation is
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by using a multinomial probit estimation method with random effect 2).
Because the probability of choice j sum to 1, we can estimate the differences
among alternative choices.  Here, we set j=0, the choice of “do nothing” as the
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model is known as a probit model with random effect (Butler and Moffitt, 1982).
The error term jiu is normally distributed, so that
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where K represents the maximum number of the actual coinsurance ratio, N is
also the maximum number 4) of individual number i, Im is m?m identity matrix,
Jm is the m?m matrix that all elements are one.
  The estimation procedure is the BHHH method with grid search over
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  Table3 shows estimation results.  The upper table is the estimation result of
the demand for medical services, while the lower table is that of the demand for
OTC medicine.  The coefficient of the real coinsurance rate in the upper table
is significantly negative.  The marginal effect of this coefficient indicates that
a 10% increase in the real coinsurance rate, for example from 30% to 40%,
decreases the demand for medical service by 6.27 percentage points.  This
results is much higher than the 3.61 percentage points estimated by Ii and
Ohkusa(1999b).  Age has a significantly positive effect on the demand for
medical services, and its marginal effect implies that 10 additional years of age
increases demand by 3.07 percentage points.
  The coefficient of the real coinsurance rate in the lower table is significantly
7positive.  Its marginal effect shows that a 10% increase in the actual
coinsurance rate increases the demand for OTC medicine by 4.08 percentage
points.  This results is barely lower than the 2.95 percentage points estimated
by Ii and Ohkusa(1999b).  The coefficient of age also has a significant effect:
its marginal effect indicate that 10 additional years of age decreases demand by
4.08 percentage points.
4.Bias arising from Hypothetical Choice
  Certain factors might be thought to account for the difference between the
estimation results of Table3 and those of Ii and Ohkusa(1999b).  First, the
estimation model used by Ii and Ohkusa(1999b) controls more individual
properties than that used in this paper, such as seriousness of illness and
knowledge of medication.  Another factor is the difference between the
samples.  Moreover, Ii and Ohkusa(1999b) do not include random effects, as
they do not use CA.  In addition, the methodology may be thought to make a
difference.  While the data used in Ii and Ohkusa(1999b) are based on actual
choice, the data used in this paper are based on hypothetical choice.  Since
hypothetical choice need not be consistent with actual choice, there is a bias
arising from hypothetical choice in Table3.
  To confirm the impact of this bias, we estimate the model 1 with the sample
excluded from the hypothetical scenario.  Since this estimation is based on the
actual coinsurance rate, it is possible to compare with Ii and Ohkusa(1999b).
If there is little difference in the sample property and the estimation model of
the two research projects, the difference in the results can be regarded as the
bias arising from hypothetical choice.  Needless to say, this estimation has no
random effect, since there is only one sample for one individual.
  Table 4 reports the results of estimation.  First, the actual coinsurance rate
has a significantly positive effect on the demand for medical services, and its
marginal effect is 8.41 percentage points.  This results is similar to Table3 and
is also much higher than the 3.61 percentage points estimated by Ii and
Ohkusa(1999b).
  Second, the actual coinsurance rate has a significantly negative effect on the
8demand for medical services, and its marginal effect is 3.27 percentage point.
This result is almost the same as(or a little bigger than) the 2.95 percentage
points estimated by Ii and Ohkusa(1999b).  These results suggest that the
estimation result of the demand for medical services may be more contaminated
by bias than that for OTC medicine, because of the difficulty of imaginating the
demand for medical services.
5.Bias arising from Hypothetical Scenario
  We try to evaluate the bias arising from hypothetical scenarios.  Generally
speaking, it is more difficult to imagine choices under the highly hypothetical
coinsurance rates such as 70% and 100%, which are far from the actual rates,
than those under rates such as 30% and 40%, which are near the actual rate, as
higher rates are more distant from reality than lower ones.  This bias arising
from hypothetical scenarios is a problem, not only for this research project, but
also for every research project using CA or Willing to Pay.
  To measure the magnitude of this bias, we estimate the following model:
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using the limited sample where the hypothetical scenario is a 100% coinsurance
rate for the actually insured and the actual coinsurance rate for the actually
uninsured.  The actually insured, who face a 20% or 30% coinsurance rate,
have great difficulty imagining choice under this scenario, whereas the actually
uninsured can easily imagine it.
  The explanatory variable Ni is the present actually uninsured dummy and Mi is
the all uninsured dummy.  If these dummies are significant, this should be
9interpreted as evidence of bias arising from hypothetical scenarios.  Other
explanatory variables and the estimation method are the same, as in the previous
subsection.
  Table5 shows the estimation results.  The all uninsured dummy has a
significantly positive effect on demand for medical services, but a significantly
negative effect on demand for OTC medicine. The marginal effect of these
coefficients indicates that the bias is about 12.6 percentage points for the
demand for medical service and 12.7 percentage points for the demand for OTC
medicine.  We therefore conclude that this bias is very large and cannot be
ignored.
6.Concluding Remarks
  This paper examines by means of Conjoint Analysis the choice of treatment
by people suffering from the common cold in Japan.  A 10% increase in the
real coinsurance rate decrease by 6.27 percentage points the demand for medical
services, and increases 4.08 percentage points the demand for OTC medicine.
Both these estimated results are higher than those of Ii and Ohkusa(1999b).  To
account for the differences between the two research projects, we have analysed
the bias arising from hypothetical choice and the bias arising from hypothetical
scenarios.  Our empirical results show that the former bias in the demand for
medical services is bigger than that for the demand for OTC medicine, and that
the later grew by up to 12 percentage points.
  The problems arising from these biases are common to all research projects
using CA.  We believe that the analysis of these biases and the method of
controlling them is an important issue in future research.
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Footnote:
*)We would like to acknowledge the cooperation of Prof. Shigeno in Osaka City
University with respect to the overall design of the questionnaire.  Needless
to say, any remaining errors are ours.
1) Bryan et al(1998) also focused on the biases arising from the design of CA.
They checked the robustness of results by comparing two estimators from
different samples.  However, they don’t investigate the biases arising from
hypothetical choice and hypothetical scenarios.
2)In Japan, there are two types of health insurance: regional and employment-
based.  In the employment-based health insurance, the coinsurance rate of
the insured is 20% for all services, while their dependents’ rete are 20% for
inpatient service, and 30% for their outpatient services. However their actual
coinsurance rates may be lower than the legal rate, since employees of large
companies are subsided.  In the regional health insurance, a coinsurance rate
of all subscribers is 30% for all service.
3)Multinominal Probit model with random effect was used for estimates in
Daganzo(1979) and Hauseman and McFadden(1984).
4)For example, because the coinsurance rate of regional health insurance does
not become 30% or less, the number of k differs between an individuals.
5)This procedure is as accurate as Keane(1992)has shown.
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Table1: Descriptive Statistics
MeanStandard DeviationMin mumMaximum
Age 47.53631 11.9013 20 78
Gender 0.42463 0.49474 0 1
Education status 0.56801 0.49581 0 1
Presence of dependents0.83824 0.36857 0 1
Working status in this year0.76326 0.42549 0 1
Working status in the last year0.7114 0.45353 0 1
Health status 0.95327 0.21126 0 1
Labor income in the last year510.6329 387.02904 0 2250
Household income in the last year718.0985 450.1444 0 2250
Household income-Labor income339.1892 400.93148 0 1950
Household assets 2619.39 2284.96782 0 7500
Attendance of life insurance0.88603 0.31807 0 1
Attendance of private health insurance0.56985 0.49555 0 1
The actually uninsured in this year0.007353 0.085512 0 1
The actually uninsured0.034926 0.18376 0 1
Actual coinsurance ratio0.234465 0.0891138 0 1
Notes:
“Gender” takes 1 if female and 0 if male.  “Education” takes 1 if graduated from a
university or collage and takes 0 if not.  “Presence of dependents” takes 1 if they have
dependents and 0 if not.  “Working status in the last year”and “Working status in this
year” take 1 if working and 0 if not.  “Attendance of private insurance” and
“Attendance of life insurance” take 1 if they attend the insurance and 0 if not.  “The
actually uninsured” takes 1 if they were the actually uninsured in last year or are the one
in this year and takes 0 if otherwise.  “Health status” takes 1 if they reports “fine”,
“usually” and “not fine much” and takes 0 if otherwise.  “Labor income” and
“Household income” are showed at 10,000 yen.
Table2: Distribution of Coinsurance Rates 
Actual Coinsurance RateNumber of SamplesPercentageCumulative Percentage
0 5 1.03 1.03
0.1 9 1.85 2.88
0.15 7 1.44 4.32
0.2 303 62.35 66.67
0.3 158 32.51 99.18
1 4 0.82 100
total 486 100
Note: 0.1 of Actual coinsurance rate means 10%.
Table3: Estimation Result of Demand for Health Care using Conjoint Analysis
CoefficientMarginal Effectt-valuesp-values
[Demand for medical service]
Age 0.00968160.00307657 1.816 0.069
G ender 0.16997890.05401531 1.202 0.229
Education 0.00675740.00214733 0.165 0.869
Working status in this year-0.1447855-0.04600944-0.498 0.619
log(Labor income in the last year)0.01535180.004878430.286 0.775
log(Household income in the last year)0.02598690.008258030.567 0.571
Household assets 0.0000282 8.97E-06 1.296 0.195
Real coinsurance rate-1.974177-0.62734708-11.001 0.000
constant -0.54303 -1.23800 0.216
[Demand for OTC medicine]
Age -0.0111743-0.0041939-2.327 0.020
G ender -0.0918302-0.03446525-0.734 0.463
Education 0.01978170.007424380.521 0.603
Working status in this year-0.0626257-0.02350436-0.204 0.838
log(Labor income in the last year)-0.0082176-0.00308418-0.147 0.883
log(Household income in the last year)0.08083510.03033863 1.443 0.149
Household assets -0.0000185 -6.94E-06 -0.883 0.377
Real coinsurance rate1.087356 0.408101229.781 0.000
constant -0.02978 -0.06500 0.948
Note:
(1)Estimation method is Trinominal Probit Model with random effect.  The number of the
samples is 2733(486 house), log likelihood is -2198.3691 and Pseudo R2 is 0.0273.
The differnce of an error term of medical service and that of doing nothing is correlated with
the differnce of an error term of medical service and that of OTC medicine.  Their
correlation coefficient(t-value) s 0.77(3.17).  Variance of the difference of an error term of
medical service and that of doing nothing is 1.21(6.96) while variance of the difference of an
error term of medical service and that of OTC medicine is normalized as one.  Variance of
random effect in demand for medical service is 1.17(5.32) and that in demand for OTC
medicine is 1.01(9.78).
(2)Explanatory variables are same as Table1.
Table4: Estimation Result of Demand for Health Care using Actual Coinsurance Rate Sample
CoefficientMarginal Effectt-valuesp-values
[Demand for medical service]
Age 0.0069413 0.00274025 0.865 0.387
G ender 0.3119696 0.12315743 1.381 0.167
Education -0.0152059-0.00600288 -0.27 0.787
Working status in this year0.8396021 0.3314529 1.409 0.159
log(Labor income in the last year)-0.1343639-0.05304337 -1.226 0.220
log(Household income in the last year)-0.0327162-0.01291549 -0.38 0.704
Household assets 0.0000441 1.74E-05 1.371 0.170
Real(Actual) coinsurance rate-2.129579-0.84070182 -2.326 0.020
constant -0.01410 -0.01800 0.985
[Demand for OTC medicine]
Age -0.0074089-0.00295558 -0.928 0.353
G ender -0.2363165-0.09427255 -1.074 0.283
Education 0.02884090.01150537 0.516 0.606
Working status in this year-0.8171296-0.32597338 -1.385 0.166
log(Labor income in the last year)0.1153775 0.04602696 1.068 0.285
log(Household income in the last year)0.0542368 0.0216364 0.619 0.536
Household assets -0.0000384 -1.53E-05 -1.201 0.230
Real(Actual) coinsurance rate0.8194532 0.32690035 0.954 0.340
constant 0.10432 0.13600 0.891
Note:
(1)Estimation method is Trinominal Probit Model and the number of the samples is 486, log likelihood
is -405.81051 and Pseudo R2 i  0.0252.
The differnce of an error term of medical service and that of doing nothing is correlated with the
differnce of an error term of OTC medicine and that of doing nothing. Their correlation coefficient(t-
value) is 0.64(2.47).  Variance of the difference of an error term of OTC medicine and that of doing
nothing is 1.12(4.19) while variance of the difference of an error term of medical service and that of
doing nothing is normalized as one.
(2)Explanatory variables are same as Table1.
Table5: Estimation Result of Demand for Health Care When Coinsurance Rate is 100%
CoefficientMarginal Effectt-valuesp-values
[Demand for medical service]
Age 0.0165033 0.00275376 2.169 0.030
G ender 0.0320384 0.00534584 0.151 0.880
Education 0.0311655 0.00520021 0.516 0.606
Working status in this year0.0337776 0.00563604 0.051 0.959
log(Labor income in the last year)-0.0221069 -0.0036887 -0.183 0.855
log(Household income in the last year)0.0686464 0.01145416 0.546 0.585
Household assets 0.0000117 1.95E-06 0.345 0.730
The actually uninsured in this year-0.3908659 -6.52E-02 -0.608 0.543
The actually uninsured0.7555946 0.12607664 2.908 0.004
constant -2.70012 -2.98400 0.003
[Demand for OTC medicine]
Age -0.0131898-0.00417133 -1.98 0.048
G ender 0.0060884 0.00192549 0.036 0.971
Education 0.0602944 0.01906841 1.197 0.231
Working status in this year-0.164274 -0.05195247 -0.391 0.696
log(Labor income in the last year)0.0144182 0.00455982 0.188 0.851
log(Household income in the last year)0.0842966 0.02665921 1.24 0.215
Household assets 1.06E-06 3.37E-07 0.038 0.970
The actually uninsured in this year-0.0203321 -6.43E-03 -0.038 0.970
The actually uninsured-0.4015091 -0.12697924 -1.687 0.092
constant 0.74397 1.27500 0.202
Note:
(1)Estimation method is Trinominal Probit Model.  The number of the samples is 486, log likelihood
is -418.93874 and PseudoR2 i  0.0328.
The differnce of an error term of medical service and that of doing nothing is correlated with the
differnce of an error term of OTC medicine and that of doing nothing. Their correlation coeffient(-
value) is 0.56(4.40).  Variance of the difference of an error term of OTC medicine and that of doing
nothing is 1.45(5.17) while variance of the difference of an error term of medical service and that of
doing nothing is normalized as one.
(2)Explanatory variables are same as Table1.
